تحشیه: اهمیت ویلیام جیمز برای پدیدارشناسی هوسرل

به نام خدا
متن موقت

The Phenomenological Movement (A Historical Introduction); Herbert Spiegelberg; third revised and enlarged edition With the Collaboration of Karl Schuhmann; Kluwer Academic Publishers; 1994.

P. 745:
horizon or fringe (Horizont; also HoI in the sense of "halo"): the fringe of marginal acts and contents which surrounds the thematic core of the field of intentional consciousness.

افق یا چتر (Horizont؛ همچنین HoI به معنای «هاله»): چتر اعمال و محتواهای مرزی که هستۀ مضمونی حوزۀ آگاهی قصدی را احاطه کرده است.

p. 100-103:
Husserl's conception of intention shows, however, unmistakable traces of William James's inspiration. The matter is important enough to justify a brief digression into the relation between Husserl's phenomenology and William James's psychology.

با این حال، مفهوم هوسرلی قصد، رگه‌های انکارنشدنی الهام‌گیری از ویلیام جیمز را نشان می‌دهد. موضوع به اندازه‌ای مهم است که یک حاشیه‌روی کوتاه در رابطۀ بین پدیدارشناسی هوسرل و روان‌شناسی ویلیام جیمز را توجیه کند.

Excursus: William James's Significance for Husserl's Phenomenology

In the preceding chapter I had occasion to discuss the immediate outcome of James's visit to Carl Stumpf in Prague on October 30, 1882. But this was not the end of the story. Their encounter influenced also the further course of the Phenomenological Movement.

تحشیه: اهمیت ویلیام جیمز برای پدیدارشناسی هوسرل

در فصل قبل فرصتی داشتم تا در مورد نتیجه فوری دیدار جیمز از کارل شتومپف در پراگ در 30 اکتبر 1882 بحث کنم. اما این پایان داستان نبود. برخورد آنها بر روند بعدی جنبش پدیدارشناسی نیز تأثیر گذاشت.

To be sure, James himself does not seem to have taken more than casual notice of the beginnings of a Phenomenological Movement. All that can be proved is that he knew Brentano's and Stumprs pre-phenomenological statements. As far as Meinong is concerned James referred to him in 1908 as the "unspeakable Meinong,(62) an outburst explained not only by James's opposition to the intricacy of Meinong's doctrine of "supposals" and of his Objektive, but also to his "complacent Breite".(63)

مطمئناً، به نظر نمی‌رسد که خود جیمز بیش از حد معمول به آغاز یک جنبش پدیدارشناسانه توجه کرده باشد. تنها چیزی که می توان ثابت کرد این است که او گفته های پیش پدیدارشناختی برنتانو و شتومپرز را می دانست. تا آنجا که به ماینونگ مربوط می شود، جیمز در سال 1908 از او به عنوان «مینونگ ناگفتنی» (62) یاد کرد، طغیانی که نه تنها با مخالفت جیمز با پیچیدگی دکترین «فرضیات» ماینونگ و هدف او توضیح داده شد، بلکه به دلیل «خود راضی بودن» او نیز توضیح داده شد. بریت».(63)

How far was James aware of the existence of a German professor by the name of Husserl, in whom some of the travelling Harvard students began to take an interest during the first decade of the new century? Hardly more than superficially. (64) It seems to be no longer ascertainable whether he ever read anything of Husserl's work. The appearances are against it. But he must have heard about him at the International Congress of Psychology in Rome in April 1905, where Husserl's antipsychologism was discussed in James's presence and Theodor Lipps criticized James's paper as an example of such psychologism. However, the story that it was James who had advised Houghton Mifflin against publishing Walter B. Pitkin's translation of the Logical Investigations, which grieved Husserl so much, is almost certainly a legend based on Pitkin's ambiguous report to Husserl at the time and his later fanciful autobiography. James's disinterest, during his last years of intensified hostility to logic, in a new German logician is, however, plausible enough.(65)

جیمز تا چه اندازه از وجود یک استاد آلمانی به نام هوسرل آگاه بود که برخی از دانشجویان دوره گرد هاروارد در دهه اول قرن جدید به او علاقه نشان دادند؟ به سختی بیشتر از سطحی. (64) به نظر می رسد دیگر نمی توان مشخص کرد که آیا او هرگز چیزی از آثار هوسرل را خوانده است یا خیر. ظواهر مخالف آن است. اما او باید در کنگره بین المللی روانشناسی در رم در آوریل 1905 درباره او شنیده باشد، جایی که ضد روانشناسی هوسرل در حضور جیمز مورد بحث قرار گرفت و تئودور لیپس مقاله جیمز را به عنوان نمونه ای از این روانشناسی مورد انتقاد قرار داد. با این حال، این داستان که جیمز بود که به هاتون میفلین توصیه کرده بود که ترجمه والتر پیتکین از تحقیقات منطقی را منتشر نکند، که هوسرل را بسیار اندوهگین کرد، تقریباً به طور قطع یک افسانه است که بر اساس گزارش مبهم پیتکین به هوسرل در آن زمان و زندگی نامه خیالی بعدی او ساخته شده است. گرچه، بی‌علاقگی جیمز، در آخرین سال‌های تشدید خصومت‌اش با منطق، به منطق‌دان جدید آلمانی به اندازه کافی قابل قبول است.(65).

But there is one remote and yet more lasting effect of the momentous encounter between James and Stumpf which we can now trace with considerable certainty: that upon Edmund Husserl. Students of Husserl's work have often been struck by the many parallels between his phenomenological insight into the structure of consciousness and some of the central chapters in James's Principles of Psychology. Thus Alfred Schutz pointed out in considerable detail the parallels, or, as he put it, the coalescence between the two in such matters as the doctrine of the stream of thought, mentioning at the same time James's doctrine of fringes and that of intersubjectivity.(66)

اما یک اثر راه‌دور و در عین حال ماندگارتر از رویارویی مهم بین جیمز و شتومف وجود دارد که اکنون می‌توانیم آن را با قطعیت قابل توجهی ردیابی کنیم: اثر بر ادموند هوسرل. شاگردان آثار هوسرل اغلب از شباهت‌های فراوانی بین بینش پدیدارشناختی او در مورد ساختار آگاهی و برخی از فصل‌های اصلی در کتاب اصول روان‌شناسی جیمز متاثر شده‌اند. بنابراین آلفرد شوتس با جزییات قابل توجهی به تشابهات، یا، به قول خودش، ادغام این دو در موضوعاتی مانند آموزۀ جریان فکر اشاره کرد و در عین حال به آموزۀ حواشی جیمز و نظریه بین الاذهانی اشاره کرد.

It seems to me safe, however, to go considerably beyond a mere statement of coincidences. Of course it is well known that Husserl himself was most generous in acknowledging his debt to James in general terms, especially in conversation with American visitors during the twenties and thirties.(67) Yet with the exception of one footnote in the Logische Untersuchungen, which is to be sure very outspoken,(68) there is a conspicuous absence of specific references to James, especially in Husserl's ldeen, the main source for Husserl's conception of the stream of consciousness - even allowing for Husserl's diminishing tendency to refer to the writings of other philosophers. Nevertheless, references can be found in Husserl's posthumous work, e.g., in Husserliana VI and VII.

با این حال، به نظر من بی خطر است که به طور قابل توجهی فراتر از بیان تصادفی صرف برویم. البته معروف است که خود هوسرل در اعتراف به بدهی خود به جیمز به طور کلی سخاوتمندترین عمل را داشت، به ویژه در گفتگو با بازدیدکنندگان آمریکایی در دهه های بیست و سی. (67) با این حال، به استثنای یک پانوشت در Logische Untersuchungen، که مطمئناً بسیار صریح است غیبت آشکاری از ارجاعات خاص به جیمز، به ویژه در کتاب افکار هوسرل، منبع اصلی برای برداشت هوسرل از جریان آگاهی وجود دارد، حتی این امکان را به وجود می‌آورد که تمایل هوسرل برای ارجاع به نوشته‌های فیلسوفان دیگر در حال کاهش باشد. با این وجود، ارجاعاتی را می توان در آثار پس از مرگ هوسرل یافت، به عنوان مثال، در مجلدات 6 و 7 Husserliana.

Thanks to contemporary and later documents and witness accounts, it is now possible to piece together the story to a much greater extent than before. Apparently it was Carl Stumpf who first drew Husserl's attention to James. There would have been ample occasion for such reminders, even before the appearance of the Principles in 1890, during the three years between 1886 and 1889 which the two Brentano students spent together in Halle, and which began four years after the encounter between James and Stumpf in Prague. Besides, Husserl himself told Dorion Cairns in 1931 that it had been Stumpf who had referred him first to James's Psychology.(69)

Husserl first read it when he gave his Psychologie-Iectures of 1891/92.(70) The earliest results of this study of James can be found in an article of 1894(71) where, in his discussion of the contents of cognitive acts, he refers twice to James's chapter on "The Stream of Thought" and specifically to his doctrine of "fringes." In his later references to these early studies Husserl seems to have spoken variously of his intention to review James's Principles (to Alfred Schutz), of having discontinued the series for the Monatshejte in order to study James more thoroughly (to Dorion Cairns), and even of having abandoned his plan of writing a psychology, "feeling that James had said what he wanted to say" (to Ralph Barton Perry).(72)

But apart from these oral statements, explained more or less by the occasion, there is now much more contemporary and unquestionable testimony in the shape of Husserl's confidential diary written during the so-called crisis of 1906. Here, in describing his early quandaries about the relation between the world of pure logic and that of conscious acts, and between the phenomenological and the logical spheres, Husserl put down the following sentences about his first years as a lecturer at the University of Halle:

Then in 1891-92 came the lecture course on psychology which made me look into the literature on descriptive psychology, in fact look forward to it with longing. James's Psychology, of which I could read only some and very little, yielded some flashes (Btitze). I saw how a daring and original man did not let himself be held down by tradition and attempted to really put down what he saw and to describe it. Probably this influence was not without significance for me, although I could read and understand precious few pages. Indeed, to describe and to be faithful, this was absolutely indispensable. To be sure, it was not until my article of 1894 that I read larger sections and took excerpts from them.(73)

Fortunately at least some of these excerpts have been found (K I 33/ 59-81), i.e., those dealing with most of the chapter on The Perception of Space (Principles oj Psychology, volume II Ch. XX; see Husserl-Chronik, p. 41). There is additional evidence of such studies in his copy of vol. I with intensive marking, especially in Ch. IX (The Stream of Thought), XI (Attention) and XII (Conception). The exact significance of these studies and their effect on Husserl's article in the Monalshejle of 1894 deserves careful study on the basis of this new evidence, which is not directly accessible to me.(74)

But such evidence is no substitute for a concrete demonstration of James's influence in Husserl's own writings. That in the case of a thinker like Husserl such an influence could never take the form of mere passive reception goes without saying. For this if for no other reason no explicit credit could be expected in each specific case. Besides, many of these influences may have been at work almost unnoticed and may simply have helped to accelerate certain developments already in progress. Little would be needed to show traces of James's inspiration in the case of such conceptions as that of the "stream of consciousness" (Husserl's rendering of James's usual phrase "stream of thought") after the pUblication of the second volume of the Logische Untersuchungen, which had been in the making in the years after 1894; the same applies to concepts like that of the "fringe" and of the "fiat" now accessible through Schuhmann's Index nominum. But there is one case, possibly even more important, where James's influence is less obvious and has not yet been noticed: Husserl's concept of intentionality.

The usual, superficially correct, story is that Husserl had taken over the term and the general idea from Franz Brentano's Psychologie, to whom Husserl gave specific credit, at least in the crucial fifth of the six investigations of the second volume, although the term makes its first appearance in the first one on "Expression and Meaning." But more attentive students like Ludwig Landgrebe(75) noticed long ago that for Husserl, in contrast to Brentano, the term "intention" (which never occurs in noun form in Brentano) stands for something much more than, and rather different from, mere relatedness to an object (as supposedly in Brentano), namely (i) for the character in our acts which allows different acts to have identically the same object; and (ii) for an active and in fact creative achievement, rather than for a passive or merely static directedness.

What was responsible for this change in Husserl's interpretation of the phenomenon with all its implications, among which Landgrebe includes even Husserl's later idealism? Landgrebe thinks that the germ for these distinctive features can be found retrospectively in Husserl's studies on the philosophy of arithmetic. Without denying this possibility, it seems to me equally important to point out what motifs in James's Principles pertinent to this issue could have awakened a creative response in Husserl's thinking.

As to the first original trait in Husserl's picture of intention, i.e., the identifying function of intentionality, the most relevant passages occur in Principles, Chapter XII (Conception), under the name of "the principle of constancy in the mind's meanings":

The same matters can be thought of in successive portions of the mental stream, and some of these portions can know that they mean the same matters which the other portions meant. One might put it otherwise by saying that the mind can always intend, and know when it intends, to think of the Same. - This sense of sameness is the very keel and backbone of our thinking. (p. 459)

It also deserves mention that in James this whole problem makes its appearance in connection with his momentous doctrine of the two types of knowledge referring to the same object, the pre-predicative knowledge by acquaintance with it, and the predicative knowledge about it, a distinction which will likewise make its appearance in Husserl.

Here then is a place where James tackles the very problem which Husserl, in contrast to Brentano, came to consider as central both in the Logische Untersuchungen and later in his studies on the phenomenological constitution of objects. And what is particularly suggestive: he employs in this context the verb "to intend" to express an intention to think, in other words, he sees intention as a practical function applied to an intellectual act.

Later, James also refers to "conceptions" or "things intended to be thought about," which in contrast to the "flux of opinions" stand stiff and immutable like Plato's "Realm of Ideas." Here, in the "things intended to be thought about," we have almost Husserl's term "intentional object".

Finally, in developing, in opposition to a copy theory of knowledge, his own view of knowledge as a self-transcendent function, James speaks of the goal of the mind as "to take cognizance of a reality, intend it, or be 'about' it." Thus James actually used, however casually, in a cognitive context the infinitive "to intend" in the active, if not yet productive, sense of aiming at, pointing, or meaning which Ludwig Landgrebe stresses as the second important difference between Brentano's and Husserl's conceptions of intentionality.(76)

Again, one must not overemphasize the importance of such agreements in formulation and assert a direct loan from James on Husserl's part. But it seems reasonable to assume that even in the case of Husserl's doctrine of intentionality James's chapter on Conception was an important directive stimulus in the transformation of the Brentano motif.

Of course, it must always be borne in mind that James's primary interest in this area was psychological. By contrast, Husserl's concern was mostly epistemological. And eventually, whether for better or for worse, the whole development and use of the concept in Husserl's philosophy exceeded anything that can be found in James's striking but relatively incidental discussion.

p. 156-157:

61 Major works discussing the relation between Husserl's phenomenology and William James's thought include Johannes Linschoten, Auf dem Wege zu einer phllnomenologischen Psychologie. Die Psychologie von William James 1961; translated by A. Giorgi. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965. Bruce Wilshire, William James and Phenomenology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, I96S. John Wild, The Radical Empiricism oj William James. New Vork: Doubleday, 1969. These books and other pertinent literature are discussed by James M. Edie in an article on "William James and Phenomenology" in Review of Metaphysics XXIII (1970), 481-527. The latest book on the subject is Richard Stevens's James and Husserl. The Foundations of Meaning (Phaenomenologica 60). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974. - More work remains to be done especially in view of the new information about Husserl's unpublished manuscripts now accessible on the basis of Karl Schuhmann's Index nominum; see his HusserlChronik, p. XII.

62) Letter to Henry N. Gardiner in R. B. Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, II, 484-S5.

63) Oral communication from Dickinson S. Miller .

64) The fact that, according to K. Schuhmann "Husserl and Hodgson" JBSP (1972), 64, the Husserl Archives in Louvain contain a reprint of James's articles from the Journal of Philosophy of 1904 ("A World of Pure Experience"), on which Husserl himself inscribed "Vom Verf." (author's gift) proves little about James's interest in Husserl.

65) See my "What William James Knew about Edmund Husserl: On the Credibility of Pitkin's Testimony," (with Supplement 1979) in The Context oj the Phenomenological Movement. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 19SI, pp. lOS-liS .

66) "William James's Conception of the Stream of Thought Phenomenologically Interpreted" in PPR I (1941), 442-452. See also the paper by Aron Gurwitsch on "The Object of Thought" in PPR VII (1947), 347-353.

67) See also Husserl's remark to Arnold Metzger in "William James and the Crisis of Philosophy," In Commemoration of William lames (New York: Columbia University Press), 1942, p. 209 .

68) " ... It will be apparent from the present work that James's brilliant (genial) observations in the field of descriptive psychology of the cognitive experiences (Vorstellungserlebnisse) are far from making psychologism inevitable. For the help and progress which I owe to this excellent investigator in the field of descriptive analysis have only aided my emancipation from the psychologistic position" (Logische Untersuchungen, II, I [Second edition], p. 208). In referring to James's anti-psychologistic tendencies Husserl may be thinking, among other things, of the "thoroughgoing dualism" between mind knowing and thing known in Principles I, 296 ff.

«... از کار حاضر آشکار خواهد شد که مشاهدات درخشان (genial) جیمز در زمینۀ روان‌شناسی توصیفی تجارب شناختی (Vorstellungserlebnisse) به دور از ناگزیرساختن روان‌شناسی‌گرایی است. از جهت کمک و پیشرفتی که من به این محقق برجسته در زمینۀ تحلیل توصیفی مدیون ام است که تنها به رهایی من از موقعیت روانشناسی‌گرا کمک کرده است» (پژوهشهای منطقی، 2، 1 (ویراست دوم)، ص208 [من این پانوشت را کتاب هوسرل نتوانستم یافت]). هوسرل در ارجاع به گرایشهای ضد روانشناسی‌گرایانۀ جیمز، ممکن است در میان چیزهای دیگر، به «دوگانه‌انگاری سراسری» بین ذهن شناسنده و چیز شناخته‌شده در اصول روانشناسی، ج1، ص296 به بعد اندیشیده باشد.

69) See his Conversations with Husserl and Fink. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, p. 36.

70) K. Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik, p. 32.

71) HPsychologische Studien lur elementaren Logik" in Philosophische Monotshefte, XXX (1894), 159-191.

72) From diary notes of 1930, which R. B. Perry copied for me.

73) "Persönliche Aufzeichnungen" in PPR XVI (1956), 294 f. The only other thinker mentioned by Husserl in this context is Meinong, but in a rather critical vein. All the more impressive is the testimony to James's influence.

74) For a beginning see Michael Tavuzzi "A Note on Husserl's Dependence on William James" in IBSP 10 (1979), 194-196.

75) "Husserl's Phanomenologie und die Motive zu ihrer Umbildung," published first in Revue internationale de philosophie I (1939) and again in PhlJnomenologie und Metaphysik. Hamburg: Schroeder, 1949, pp. 56-100. See also my "Intention und Intentionalitat in der Scholastik, bei Brentano und bei Husser!" in Philosophische Hefte V (1936), 75-91, revised in Studia philosophica XXIX (1970), 189-216 and translated by Linda L. McAlister in The Philosophy of Brentano London: Duckworth, 1975, pp. 108-127, also reprinted with Supplement 1979 in Spiegelberg. The Context of the Phenomenological Movement. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981, pp. 3-26.

76) "Intending" in the sense of "pointing at" also occurs in the, for James, very important essay on "The Function of Cognition" of 1884, first published in Mind X (1885) and republished in The Meaning of Truth, pp. 1-42; the passage referred to appears on p. 23. However, in spite of some highly interesting parallels between James's and Husserl's views in this essay, particularly concerning the latter's doctrine of intersubjectivity. it seems unlikely that Husserl was familiar with this article.

James's Theory of Fringes

Author(s): Christopher J. Broniak

Source: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), pp.443-468

Published by: Indiana University Press

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320611

James limits the bulk of his explicit discussion of fringes to selections within the "stream of thought" and "conception" chapters of the Principles (and their corresponding chapters in the Briefer Course as well as James's Talks to Teachers on Psychology) and the stream's 1884 predecessor, "On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology." A review of the indices of the Harvard series of the Works of William James for the entry "fringe" turned up only three other references: one from The Will to Believe ("On Some Hegelisms," quoted in the upcoming subsection on the perception of space); another from Essays in Psychology ("Thought Before Language" [1892]), and the third from Essays in Philosophy ("The Knowing of Things Together" [1894], which is important for the following subsections on temporal and modal perception). Several of James's major works in the series do not have "fringe" index entries. They include Pragmatism, The Meaning of Truth, A Pluralistic Universe, Some Problems of Philosophy, and Essays in Radical Empiricism.

جیمز بخش عمده ای از بحث صریح خود دربارۀ fringes را به گزیده‌هایی در فصلهای مربوط به «جریان فکر» و «ادراک» کتابهای اصول روانشناسی (و فصلهای مربوط به آنها در دورۀ مختصر روانشناسی و همچنین سخنان جیمز با معلمان روانشناسی) و جریان اسبق 1884، "دربارۀ برخی از حذفیات روانشناسی درون‌نگر" محدود می‌کند. مروری بر نمایه‌های مجموعه آثار چاپ هاروارد ویلیام جیمز برای مدخل fringe تنها سه مرجع دیگر را نشان داد: یکی اراده به‌سوی ایمان ("دربارۀ برخی هگل‌گراییها" که در بخش فرعی آینده در مورد ادراک فضا نقل شده است). دیگری مقالاتی در روان‌شناسی ("تفکر قبل از زبان" [1892])، و سومی مقالاتی در فلسفه ("شناخت چیزها با هم" [1894]، که برای بخش‌های فرعی زیر دربارۀ ادراک زمانی و موجهاتی مهم است). تعدادی از آثار اصلی جیمز در این مجموعه دارای مدخل نمایۀ «fringe» نیستند. آنها عبارت اند از مذهب صلاح عملی، معنای حقیقت، جهان متکثر، برخی مسائل فلسفه و مقالاتی در تجربه‌گرایی ریشه‌ای.

Second-order elements: "feelings of tendency"

There is a third kind of conscious state James initially refers to as "feelings of tendency." He gives three examples of the type of states he means. First, he has us suppose that three different people successively say to us, "Wait!" "Hark!" "Look!" Suppose you are on a bird watching expedition.

You hear the command "Wait!" Your state of mind changes to one of active preparation: you stop in your tracks, perhaps look around, all the while at least implicitly guided by the next step - "Wait for what?"

This state of mind is modified by the next command: "Hark (listen)!" The "for what?" of the previous mental state gets a further clue: use your ears to discover it. You may (or may not) hear the whippoorwill's song.

The third command then follows: "Look!" For those who have heard the bird, the call to visually locate its source in addition to the sound adds yet a third preparedness. For those who haven't heard the whippoorwill, their minds might grasp this as a means instead of sound to discover the object signalled.

عناصر مرتبه دوم: "احساس تمایل"

نوع سومی از حالت آگاهانه وجود دارد که جیمز در ابتدا از آن به عنوان "احساس تمایل" یاد می کند. او سه مثال از نوع حالات مورد نظر خود را بیان می کند. اول، او از ما می خواهد فرض کنیم که سه نفر مختلف به طور متوالی به ما می گویند: "صبر کن!" "هارک!" "نگاه کن!" فرض کنید در یک سفر پرنده نگری هستید.

فرمان "صبر کن!" حالت ذهنی شما به حالت آماده سازی فعال تغییر می کند: در مسیر خود توقف می کنید، شاید به اطراف نگاه می کنید، در تمام این مدت حداقل به طور ضمنی توسط مرحله بعدی هدایت می شوید - "منتظر چه باشید؟"

این حالت ذهنی با دستور بعدی اصلاح می شود: "Hark (Listen)!" "برای چه؟" از وضعیت ذهنی قبلی یک سرنخ بیشتر به دست می‌آید: از گوش خود برای کشف آن استفاده کنید. ممکن است (یا نه) آهنگ whippoorwill را بشنوید.

سپس دستور سوم به شرح زیر است: "ببین!" برای کسانی که صدای پرنده را شنیده اند، فراخوانی که علاوه بر صدا، منبع آن را به صورت بصری تعیین کنند، آمادگی سوم را نیز به آن اضافه می کند. برای کسانی که صدای شلاق را نشنیده‌اند، ممکن است ذهنشان این را به‌جای صدا به‌عنوان وسیله‌ای برای کشف شیء سیگنال‌دهی شده درک کند.

James's three examples of feelings of tendency differ from each other according to the material content with which each set of thoughts treats. By "material content" I mean the sort of "stuff ' the thoughts work with to arrive at some relatively stable conclusion.

For instance, James's first example deals virtually with sensorial images alone. At the opposite extreme is the third example, where thoughts cash out almost exclusively in terms of language.

The second example seems to combine both types of material: both sense and thought are part of the process of recalling a forgotten name. By means of all three examples, I believe James meant to show that feelings of tendency can be found anywhere along the continuum between consciousness's simplest (sensations, impressions) and most complex (language, concepts, ideas) accomplishments.

سه نمونه احساسات گرایش جیمز با توجه به محتوای مادی که هر مجموعه از افکار با آن برخورد می کند با یکدیگر متفاوت است. منظور من از "محتوای مادی" نوعی "ماده" است که افکار با آن کار می کنند تا به نتیجه ای نسبتاً پایدار برسند. مثلاً اولین نمونۀ جیمز مجازاً به تصاویر حسی می پردازد. در نقطه مقابل، مثال سوم است، که در آن افکار تقریباً منحصراً از نظر زبان نقد می‌شوند. به نظر می رسد مثال دوم هر دو نوع ماده را با هم ترکیب می کند: هم حس و هم فکر بخشی از فرآیند یادآوری نام فراموش‌شده است. با استفاده از هر سه مثال، من معتقدم جیمز قصد داشت نشان دهد که احساسات تمایل را می توان در هر جایی در امتداد پیوستار بین ساده ترین دستاوردهای آگاهی (احساسات، انطباعات) و پیچیده ترین آنها (زبان، مفاهیم، تصورات) یافت.

James calls these vague yet undeniable feelings of tendency fringes of objects of thought. Tendencies are among the objects of the stream . . . and must be described as ... constituted of feelings of tendency, often so vague that we are unable to name them at all. ... But all of us have this permanent consciousness of whither our thought is going. It is a feeling like any other, a feeling of what thoughts are next to arise, before they have arisen. . . . Let us use the words psychic overtone, suffusion, or fringe, to designate the influence of a faint brain process upon our own thought, as it makes it aware of relations and objects but dimly perceived. (PP I 246-249)

جیمز این احساسات مبهم و در عین حال انکارناشدنی گرایش را حاشیه های ابژه های فکری می نامد. گرایش ها از جمله موضوعات جریان هستند. . . و باید به عنوان ... مقوَّم احساسات گرایش توصیف شوند، اغلب چنان مبهم که ما اصلاً نمی توانیم آنها را نام ببریم. ... اما همه ما این آگاهی دائمی را داریم که فکرمان به کجا می رود. این احساسی است مانند هر احساس دیگری، احساسی از اینکه چه افکاری در آینده به وجود می آیند، قبل از اینکه به وجود بیایند. . . . بیایید از واژه‌های لحن روانی، افروختگی یا حاشیه استفاده کنیم تا تأثیر یک فرآیند ضعیف مغز را بر فکر خودمان مشخص کنیم، زیرا آن را از روابط و اشیاء آگاه می‌کند اما به‌طور ضعیف درک می‌شود. (اصول روانشناسی، ج1، ص 246-249)

An object of thought has a core or nucleus (topic), which may be present or absent, surrounded by present temporal and modal complexes of relations (fringes) that comprise the remainder of the thought's object. In the Principles, James distinguishes the topic of a thought from the thought's object with the following example.

Given the sentence, "Columbus discovered America in 1492," most people will select "a substantive kernel or nucleus," such as "Columbus" or "America," and say that kernel is what the thought is about. But James says that this is only the topic of the thought, because "the Object of your thought is nothing short of the entire sentence, 'Columbus-discovered-America-in-1492'" (PP I 265).

An object of thought is a bare topic thick with relations of space, time, and possibility. While all topics have fringes, not all fringes have topics. More specifically, James maintains that some topics, e.g., "absent" ones, such as "roundsquares" or "black-white-things," are defined only by their relations.

These examples "are absolutely definite conceptions; it is a mere accident, as far as conception goes, that they happen to stand for things which nature never lets us sensibly perceive" (PP I 438). This is what one would expect given the examples James provides to illustrate what he means by "feelings of tendency."

In those cases (e.g., remembering a person's name), present information about the absent topic showed that incomplete thoughts are as much a part of the stream of consciousness as complete thoughts.

یک موضوع فکری دارای قلب یا هسته (موضوع) است که ممکن است وجود داشته باشد یا وجود نداشته باشد، احاطه شده توسط مجموعه‌های زمانی و حالتی کنونی از روابط (fringes) که باقیمانده متعلق فکر را تشکیل می‌دهند. جیمز در اصول، موضوع یک فکر را از متعلق فکر با مثال زیر متمایز می کند.

با توجه به جمله "کلمب آمریکا را در سال 1492 کشف کرد"، اکثر مردم "قلب یا هسته اساسی" را انتخاب می کنند، مانند "کلمب" یا "آمریکا" و می گویند که هسته چیزی است که دربارۀ آن فکر می شود. اما جیمز می‌گوید که این فقط موضوع فکر است، زیرا متعلق فکر شما چیزی کمتر از کل گزارۀ «کلمب-کشف-آمریکا-در-1492» نیست» (PP I 265).

یک متعلق فکری، موضوعی خالی است که دارای روابط مکان، زمان و امکان است. در حالی که همه موضوعات دارای fringes هستند، همۀ fringeها دارای موضوع نیستند. به طور خاص، جیمز معتقد است که برخی از موضوعات، به عنوان مثال، موضوعات «غایب» [ممتنع]، مانند «مربع‌های گرد» یا «چیزهای سیاه-سفید» تنها با روابطشان تعریف می‌شوند.

These examples "are absolutely definite conceptions; it is a mere accident, as far as conception goes, that they happen to stand for things which nature never lets us sensibly perceive" (PP I 438). This is what one would expect given the examples James provides to illustrate what he means by "feelings of tendency."

In those cases (e.g., remembering a person's name), present information about the absent topic showed that incomplete thoughts are as much a part of the stream of consciousness as complete thoughts.

این مثال‌ها «ادراکات مطلقاً تعریف‌شده (و مسلم) هستند؛ تا جایی که تصور مجال رفتن دارد، این یک تصادف محض است که اتفاقاً برای چیزهایی قرار می‌گیرند که طبیعت هرگز به ما اجازه نمی‌دهد آنها را محسوس درک کنیم» (PP I 438). این همان چیزی است که با توجه به مثال‌هایی که جیمز ارائه می‌کند، انتظار می‌رود که منظور او از «احساسات تمایل» را نشان دهد.

در آن موارد (به عنوان مثال، به خاطر سپردن نام یک فرد)، اطلاعات کنونی دربارۀ موضوع ممتنع (غایب) نشان می دهد که افکار ناقص (عدولی؟)، به همان اندازۀ افکار کامل، بخشی از جریان آگاهی هستند.

I present James's notion of fringes as bridges to depict a faithful portrait of his unique view of the cognitive relation. The atomists viewed consciousness as far too passive, a mere tablet awaiting the world to impress itself by way of the senses.

The intellectualists ascribed to mind an overly domineering position, as imposing fixed logical structures only it could discern upon a stupid passive chaos. With fringes, James makes it much easier for cognition theorists to talk not simply about world or consciousness but instead of the far more complex, mutual interaction between them.

With this theoretical focus, one lessens the danger of repeating familiar dichotomous errors, epistemological (rationalism or empiricism?) as well as metaphysical (monistic idealism or atomistic "realism"?).

من مفهوم جیمز از fringe ها را به عنوان پلها عرضه می‌کنم تا چهره‌نمایی وفادار از دیدگاه منحصر به فرد او از رابطۀ شناختی را به تصویر بکشم. اتمیست‌ها آگاهی را بسیار منفعل می‌نگریستند، یک لوح محض در انتظار جهان برای انطباع خود از طریق حواس. عقل‌گرایان موقعیتی بیش از حد غالب را به ذهن نسبت می دادند، زیرا ساختارهای منطقی ثابتی را تحمیل می کرد که فقط می توانست آشفتگی منفعل احمقانه را تشخیص دهد. با fringe ها، جیمز کار را برای نظریه‌پردازان شناخت آسان‌تر می‌کند که نه صرفاً از جهان یا آگاهی، بلکه به جای آن از تعامل متقابل بسیار پیچیده‌تر بین آنها سخن بگویند.

با این تمرکز نظری، خطر تکرار اشتباهات دوشقی آشنا، چه معرفت‌شناختی (عقلگرایی یا تجربه‌گرایی؟) و همچنین هستی‌شناختی (واقع‌گرایی یگانه‌باور یا واقع‌گرایی اتمیستی"؟) کاهش می‌یابد.

The Importance of William James’ Theory of “Fringes” to the Constitution of a Phenomenology of Perception

Carlos Morujão

Phainomenon

VOLUMEN 26 (2017): HEFT 1 (OCTOBER 2017)

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2017-0007

Aron Gurwitch has also addressed the relation between James’ theory of the fringes and Husserl’s theory of perception (Gurwitch, 1957: 246). Nevertheless, his main interest was to show that what he called the “marginal consciousness” – i.e. the consciousness of whatever surrounds the topic of an intentional act – is always more or less structured, operating selections according to criteria of relevance for the content it focus. James was above all worried with the distinction between knowledge and mere representation. If in the process (A + B + C) = X I only pick-up a sensation that affects me in one of the temporal phases of my experience of X, he argued that I will only have a representation of X in this precisely moment; on the other hand, if I pick-up the entire process (A + B + C) and an harmonious psychic connection between the temporal phases of my experience follows, then I will have knowledge of X. I follow a trend of thought slightly different from Gurwitch’s, although not entirely opposed to it. I address the problem of selections in the next section of my paper.

آرون گورویچ همچنین به رابطه بین نظریه حواشی جیمز و نظریه ادراک هوسرل پرداخته است (گورویچ، 1957: 246). با این وجود، علاقه اصلی او این بود که نشان دهد آنچه را که او «آگاهی حاشیه‌ای» می‌نامید - یعنی آگاهی از هر چیزی که موضوع یک کنش قصدی را احاطه می‌کند - همیشه کم و بیش ساختار یافته است و انتخاب‌ها را بر اساس معیارهای مرتبط با محتوایی که تمرکز می‌کند انجام می‌دهد. . جیمز بیش از هر چیز نگران تمایز بین دانش و بازنمایی صرف بود. اگر در فرآیند A + B + C = X من فقط احساسی را برمی‌دارم که در یکی از مراحل زمانی تجربه‌ام از X بر من تأثیر می‌گذارد، او استدلال می‌کند که من فقط در این لحظه بازنمایی‌ای از X خواهم داشت. از سوی دیگر، اگر کل فرآیند را انتخاب کنم (A + B + C) و یک ارتباط روانی هماهنگ بین مراحل زمانی تجربه من به دنبال داشته باشد، آنگاه دانش X را خواهم داشت. من روند فکری را کمی متفاوت از گورویچ دنبال می کنم، اگرچه کاملاً مخالف آن نیست. من به مشکل انتخاب ها در بخش بعدی مقاله خود می پردازم.

Transitive states have something to do with what James also called the fringes of an object, although they don’t completely coincide. Transitive states are states of consciousness in which what is given appears in a certain relation to another thing (James, 1909: 204). It corresponds broadly with what Husserl used to call the external horizon of an object. (Of course the external horizon may be composed of objects quite different from the one I am focused at a certain moment.) A fringe, according to James, is a particular kind of transitive state. There is a fringe when certain images come to the mind that seem to have a close relation to the object being perceived. Can we keep these images as valid for our knowledge of the object perceived? Yes, according to James, if those images “run” in agreement with our expectations, i.e. if they allow us to improve the expected knowledge (James, 1909: 216). The phenomenon of the fringe is, in the first place, at the origin of a typical world-image, consisting in a more or less coherent and structured system of references; in the second place, from the stand-point of phenomenology, it is a condition of the process of variation, although the last is not reducible to the fringes.

حالت‌های گذرا با چیزی که جیمز آن را حاشیه‌های یک جسم نیز می‌نامد، ارتباط دارند، اگرچه کاملاً منطبق نیستند. حالت‌های گذرا، حالت‌هایی از آگاهی هستند که در آنها آنچه داده می‌شود در رابطه معینی با چیز دیگری ظاهر می‌شود (James, 1909: 204). این به طور گسترده ای با آنچه هوسرل برای نامیدن افق خارجی یک شی استفاده می کرد مطابقت دارد. (البته افق بیرونی ممکن است از اجسامی کاملاً متفاوت از آن چیزی که من در یک لحظه معین روی آن تمرکز می کنم تشکیل شده باشد.) به گفته جیمز، حاشیه نوعی حالت گذرا است. هنگامی که تصاویر خاصی به ذهن خطور می کند که به نظر می رسد رابطه نزدیکی با شیء درک شده دارند، حاشیه ای وجود دارد. آیا می‌توانیم این تصاویر را برای دانش خود از شیء درک شده معتبر نگه داریم؟ بله، به گفته جیمز، اگر آن تصاویر مطابق با انتظارات ما باشند، یعنی اگر به ما اجازه دهند دانش مورد انتظار را بهبود بخشیم (James, 1909: 216). پدیده حاشیه، در وهله اول، منشأ یک تصویر جهانی معمولی است که از یک سیستم کم و بیش منسجم و ساختار یافته از مراجع تشکیل شده است. در وهله دوم، از منظر پدیدارشناسی، شرط فرآیند تنوع است، اگرچه آخرین آن به حاشیه قابل تقلیل نیست.